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Abstract
In this paper we introduce a new type of knowledge operator, called evidence-
based knowledge, intended to capture the constructive core of common knowledge. An
evidence-based knowledge system is obtained by augmenting a multi-agent logic of
knowledge with a system of evidence assertions t :ϕ (“t is an evidence for ϕ”) based
on the following plausible assumptions: 1) each axiom has evidence; 3) evidence is
checkable; 3) any evidence implies individual knowledge for each agent. Normally, the
following monotonicity property is also assumed: 4) any piece of evidence is compatible
with any other evidence. We show that the evidence-based knowledge operator is a
stronger version of the common knowledge operator. Evidence-based knowledge is free
of logical omniscience, model-independent, and has a natural motivation. Furthermore,
evidence-based knowledge can be presented by normal multi-modal logics, which are
in the scope of well-developed machinery applicable to modal logic: epistemic models,
normalized proofs, automated proof search, etc.
1 Introduction
Common knowledge is a fundamental feature of multi-agent systems of knowledge which was
first discussed in [Lewis, 1969] and then studied in [Aumann, 1976; McCarthy et al., 1979;
Lehman, 1984; Halpern and Moses, 1990]. [Fagin et al., 1995] provides an excellent introduc-
tion to logics of knowledge in general and to common knowledge phenomena in particular.
Let K1,K2, . . . ,Kn stand for knowledge operators in an n-agent logic of knowledge and
Eϕ = K1ϕ ∧K2ϕ ∧ . . . ∧Knϕ.
Then the common knowledge operator C corresponding to K1,K2, . . . ,Kn is informally
defined as an infinite conjunction
Cϕ ⇔ ϕ ∧ Eϕ ∧ E2ϕ ∧ . . . ∧ Enϕ . . . .
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In a Kripke-style model for K1,K2, . . . ,Kn the common knowledge operator is formally
defined as the modality of reachability along paths that use accessibility edges corresponding
to any of K1,K2, . . . ,Kn.
The traditional way to capture common knowledge deductively is to use the Fixed-Point
Axiom
Cϕ ↔ E(ϕ ∧ Cϕ)
along with the Induction Rule
ϕ→E(ψ ∧ ϕ)
,
ϕ→Cψ
capturing the greatest solution of the corresponding fixed-point equation (cf. [Fagin et al.,
1995]). This kind of deductive system does not behave well proof-theoretically. In particular,
there is no conventional cut-elimination in the common-knowledge systems ([Alberucci and
Jaeger, 2005]). This practically rules out automated proof search and severely limits the
usage of formal methods in analyzing knowledge. Semi-formal model theoretical methods in
this area have their own problems, both foundational and practical. For example, paradig-
matic solutions of well-known puzzles like Muddy Children, Wise Men, Unfaithful Wives,
etc. (cf. [Fagin et al., 1995]), use a very strong, not formalized assumption that the agents
possess a common knowledge of the same Kripke-style frame of possible situations.
As presented above, common knowledge captures the most liberal version of knowledge
operator satisfying the Fixed Point Axiom, without imposing any conditions on the way this
knowledge is attained. As a result, there might be nonconstructive versions of the common
knowledge appearing by chance or for some unknown reasons or without any particular
reasons at all. Here is an informal example1 intended to show the difference between common
knowledge and knowledge based on evidence.
Bob, a graduate student, fails a standardized, multiple-choice qualifier in his
area of research. His advisor, with whom Bob has worked extensively in this
particular area, as well as his other professors–all of whom have awarded him top
grades–know that it’s not possible for Bob to have failed this exam. They do not
even consider such a possibility. In fact, Bob hasn’t failed the exam, rendering
the faculty’s belief as common knowledge. It is soon determined that a crease
in Bob’s test form was responsible for reversing his results; once this has been
taken into account and the correct results made available, the faculty acquires
evidence-based knowledge that Bob has indeed passed the qualifier.
We take this example to suggest that there is a certain need for evidence-based knowledge
systems, in particular, for analyzing social situations.
In this paper we introduce a family of new knowledge operators representing so-called
evidence-based knowledge (EBK). An (EBK)-system is obtained by augmenting a multi-agent
logic of knowledge with a system of evidence assertions t:ϕ (“t is an evidence for ϕ”) based
on the following plausible assumptions:
• all axioms have evidence;
• evidence is undeniable and implies individual knowledge of any agent.
1This version of the example was suggested by Karen Kletter.
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• evidence is checkable;
• evidence is monotone, i.e., any new piece of evidence does not spoil a given one.
An important feature of EBK-systems is their graceful handling of the logical omniscience
problem: an agent cannot claim to have evidence-based knowledge without having actually
built a supporting evidence term.
In addition, we introduce a forgetful version of the evidence-based knowledge operator Jϕ
(“there is a justification for ϕ”) obtained by collapsing all evidence terms into one modality
J :
t:ϕ 7→ Jϕ.
The forgetful EBK-systems are normal modal logics with standard Kripke-style semantics.
Moreover, for any valid fact of forgetful EBK-systems, one could recover its constructive
meaning by realizing all forgetful modalities Jϕ by appropriate evidence terms t:ϕ.
Here is a brief comparison of the forgetful EBK-operator Jϕ with the common knowledge
operator Cϕ.
Informally,
Jϕ ⇒ ϕ ∧ Eϕ ∧ E2ϕ ∧ . . . ∧ Enϕ . . . ,
but the converse “⇐” does not necessarily hold. Such a Jϕ is not necessarily unique, which
means that we have a variety of evidence-based knowledge operators.
In the epistemic Kripke-style semantics, Jϕ corresponds to any accessibility relation
which contains (but does not necessarily coincides with) reachability.
Forgetful evidence-based logics postulate J as a normal (usually S4-like) modality, and
contain enough machinery to prove the Fixed-Point Axiom for J :
Jϕ ↔ E(ϕ ∧ Jϕ)
The Induction Rule is not valid for J . This means that, unlike the common knowledge,
the evidence-based knowledge is not committed to capturing the greatest solution of the
corresponding fixed-point equation, but rather represents its generic solution.
In many traditional problems where the common knowledge has been used, the evidence-
based knowledge operator is also applicable. Moreover, EBK-systems have certain advan-
tages.
1. Forgetful EBK-systems are easier to justify since the question of whether a given
real system has an evidence-based knowledge can be reduced to checking a manageable set
of conditions. An axiomatic approach to common knowledge in the form of EBK-systems
is model-independent and seems to avoid foundational loopholes of the standard model-
theoretical reasoning about common knowledge.
2. Forgetful EBK-logics are simpler than the traditional common knowledge systems.
Evidence-based knowledge is in the scope of well-developed methods in modal logic, both
semantical and proof theoretic. These include cut-elimination theorems that yield the possi-
bility of automated proof search and verification, which have been ruled out in the traditional
common knowledge systems because of their prohibitive proof theoretical complexity.
3. Common-knowledge operator is a derivative of the agent knowledge operators and
carries the features of the latter. The evidence-based knowledge component can be chosen
independently of knowledge systems of individual agents, which provides an additional degree
of flexibility.
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2 The content of this paper
Arguably, the first paper raising the issue of epistemic logic with justification was [van
Benthem, 1991]. Such systems, along with the usual knowledge modalities, were supposed
to contain evidence assertions of the format “t is evidence for ϕ,” denoted as t:ϕ. There are
a variety of formal systems for describing evidence which could serve as a formal base for the
“evidence component” here. The first system of explicit terms capturing a modal logic, S4,
was found in [Artemov, 1995; Artemov, 2001] and known as the logic of proofs LP. A similar
system corresponding to S5 was introduced in [Artemov et al., 1999]. Finally, [Brezhnev,
2000; Brezhnev, 2001] describes systems of terms corresponding to K, K4, T, D, D4. These
systems of explicit terms share several important features. Among these are the ability to
internalize their own proofs as schematized by the Internalization Principle:
if ` ϕ, then ` p:ϕ for some proof term p,
and the validity of Realization Theorems which assert that one can retrieve explicit evidence
terms from the proof of any theorem provable in the underlying modal logic. As a result, the
forgetful projection of the logic of explicit terms is exactly the counterpart modal logic, e.g.,
S4 is the forgetful projection of LP. There are also other systems of explicit presentation of
knowledge by evidence terms (“+”-free fragment of LP, [Artemov, 2001], functional logic of
proofs [Krupski, 2002; Krupski, 2005], etc.), where compatibility of evidence is not required.
Along with the usual choices of K, T, K4, S4, and S5 for base logics of knowledge of
individual agents, this shows that the number of possible EBK-systems is rather high. We
consider three representative cases, all using the logic of proofs LP as their evidence com-
ponent: TnLP, S4nLP, and S5nLP. In all these systems, the evidence logic is LP (which
corresponds to S4), whereas the base knowledge logics could be weaker (T in TnLP), equal
to (S4 in S4nLP), or stronger than (S5 in S5nLP) the evidence logic. All these EBK-systems
are supplied with epistemic semantics capturing the notion of admissible evidence.
We also consider “forgetful counterparts” of the above EBK-systems: TJn, S4
J
n, and S5
J
n
obtained from TnLP, S4nLP, and S5nLP respectively, by collapsing
t:ϕ 7→ Jϕ.
The intended epistemic semantics of Jϕ is “there is a justification for ϕ.” The forgetful EBK-
systems TJn, S4
J
n, and S5
J
n are normal modal logics with standard Kripke-style semantics. We
show that TJn, S4
J
n, and S5
J
n enjoy an important Realization Property: given a formula ϕ in
the forgetful language derivable in TJn, S4
J
n, or S5
J
n, one could recover an evidence-carrying
formula ψ derivable in the corresponding EBK-system TnLP, S4nLP, or S5nLP respectively,
such that ϕ is a forgetful projection of ψ. The Realization Property opens a possibility of
first establishing ϕ in a forgetful EBK-system TJn, S4
J
n, or S5
J
n, which can be a relatively
easy task, and recovering constructive evidence terms behind occurrences of the forgetful
modality J in ϕ later, only if needed.
We make an easy but fundamental observation that evidence assertions t:ϕ, as well as
the forgetful evidence-based knowledge modality J , satisfy the Fixed-Point Axiom above
and hence may be regarded as a special sort of common knowledge. In terms of accessibility
relations in Kripke-style models, Jϕ corresponds to a transitive and reflexive relation R
containing (but not necessarily coinciding with) the reachability relation.
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In fact, S4Jn coincides with one of systems introduced axiomatically in [McCarthy et al.,
1979] with the modality J in S4Jn corresponding to the “any fool knows” modality. This
provides McCarthy’s dummy “any fool” agent with a justification in the form of evidence-
based epistemic semantics.
On the technical side, we prove that TJn and S4
J
n enjoy cut-elimination theorems and give
algorithms of recovering evidence terms in “any fool knows” modalities in all three forgetful
systems TJn, S4
J
n, and S5
J
n. We also find epistemic models for each of the three systems above
and establish the corresponding completeness theorems.
In Section 7, we give a complete account of the correspondence between evidence-based
knowledge Jϕ and common knowledge Cϕ. There are more EBK-systems than common
knowledge systems. When both EBK and common knowledge exist, the EBK-modality Jϕ
is stronger than the common knowledge modality Cϕ:
Jϕ ⇒ Cϕ but Cϕ 6⇒ Jϕ.
Each valid EBK-identity is common knowledge-compliant, which justifies using EBK-systems
as common knowledge systems. In particular,
(S4Jn)
∗ ⊂ S4Cn but (S4Jn)∗ 6= S4Cn ,
where ∗ stands for an operation of renaming J to C.
As an example, a solution of the wise men puzzle (Section 8) is given as a formal derivation
in TJ3 . Hence this solution counts as a common knowledge solution as well.
3 Formal systems of evidence-based knowledge
We first introduce the multi-agent logics of evidence-based knowledge series TnLP, n =
1, 2, 3.... In brief, TnLP contains n copies of T-style modalities representing knowledge op-
erators of n agents, K1, . . . ,Kn (cf. systems Tn from [Fagin et al., 1995]); in addition, it
contains a system of evidence assertions taken from the logic of proofs LP.
Evidence assertions in TnLP have the form t:ϕ, where ϕ is a formula and t is an evidence
term (or just evidence) built from constants a, b, c, . . . and variables x, y, z, . . . with the help
of three operations, application “·” (binary), union “+” (binary), and inspection “!” (unary).
Formally, if t is an evidence and S is a sentence variable, the formulas of TnLP are defined
by the following grammar
ϕ = ⊥ | S | ϕ1→ϕ2 | ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2 | ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2 | ¬ϕ | Kiϕ | t:ϕ.
We assume also that “t :,” “Ki,” and “¬” bind stronger than “∧,∨” which, in turn, bind
stronger than “→.” TnLP has axioms of both Tn and LP, together with the principle that an
evidence assertion yields knowledge of each individual agent: t:ϕ→Kiϕ. This is a schema
when there is one growing system of evidence accepted by all the agents.
Definition 1. Axioms and rules of TnLP are
I. Classical propositional logic
The standard set of axioms of the classical propositional logic, e.g.,
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A1-A10 from [Kleene, 1952] or a similar system
R1. Modus Ponens
II. Knowledge principles
Axioms and rules of T for each individual knowledge operator Ki.
B1i. Ki(ϕ→ψ)→(Kiϕ→Kiψ)
B2i. Kiϕ→ϕ
R2i. ` ϕ ⇒ ` Kiϕ (knowledge generalization)
III. Evidence principles (axioms and rules of the logic of proofs LP)
E1. s:(ϕ→ψ) → (t:ϕ→(s·t):ψ) (application)
E2. t:ϕ → !t:(t:ϕ) (inspection)
E3. s:ϕ→(s+t):ϕ, t:ϕ→(s+t):ϕ (union)
E4. t:ϕ→ϕ (reflexivity)
R3. ` c:A, where A is an axiom from I - IV and c is a proof constant
(evidence for axioms)
IV. Principle connecting evidence and knowledge
C1. t:ϕ→Kiϕ (undeniability of evidence).
Group III introduces some combinatorial properties of evidence and explains the meaning
of evidence terms. E1 is nothing but the internalized modus ponens, which says that an
evidence for ϕ→ ψ can be applied to an evidence for ϕ to produce an evidence for ψ. E2
expresses the principle that any evidence t of ϕ can be verified by a new evidence !t (this
is similar to a proof checking principle in the logic of proofs). E3 reflects the principle of
consistency and monotonicity of evidence: if t is an evidence for ϕ, then t combined with
any other evidence still remains an evidence for ϕ. R3 assigns initial evidence in the form of
constants to any axiom of TnLP. This is a formal representation of the basic assumption in
evidence-based logics that all axioms have been certified and their justifications have been
accepted by all the agents. Finally, E4 is redundant and immediately follows from B2i and
C1.
Naturally, all axioms are in fact schemas in the language of TnLP. All rules are applied
across sections I-IV.
Consider two more series of principles:
B3i. Kiϕ→KiKiϕ Positive Introspection,
B4i. ¬Kiϕ→Ki¬Kiϕ Negative Introspection.
System S4nLP is obtained from TnLP by adding B3i and S5nLP is S4nLP plus B4i, i =
1, . . . , n. Again, all the rules R2i are extended to these new axioms as well.
All these systems are closed under substitutions of evidence terms for evidence variables
and formulas for propositional variables, and enjoy the deduction theorem Γ, ϕ ` ψ ⇒ Γ `
ϕ→ψ.
Lemma 1. For any formula ϕ and each i = 1, 2, . . . , n there are evidence terms upi(x) a
such that TnLP (hence S4nLP and S5nLP) proves x:ϕ→upi(x):Kiϕ.
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Proof.
x:ϕ→Kiϕ, by C1;
a:(x:ϕ→Kiϕ), introducing evidence a, by R3;
!x:x:ϕ→(a·!x):Kiϕ, by E1 and propositional logic;
x:ϕ→ !x:x:ϕ, by E2;
x:ϕ→(a·!x):Kiϕ, by propositional logic.
It suffices now to put upi(x) equal to a·!x such that a:(x:ϕ→Kiϕ). 2
Proposition 1. [Internalization] Given TnLP ` ϕ, there is an evidence term p such that
TnLP ` p:ϕ. The same holds for S4nLP and S5nLP.
Proof. Induction on a derivation of ϕ. Base: ϕ is an axiom. Then use R3. In this case, p
is an atomic evidence (a constant). Induction step:
1. ϕ is obtained from ψ → ϕ and ψ by modus ponens. By the induction hypothesis,
` s:(ψ→ϕ) and ` t:ψ for some evidence terms s and t. Hence by E1, ` (s·t):ϕ, so p is
s·t.
2. If ϕ is obtained by R2i, then ϕ is Kiψ and ` ψ. By the induction hypothesis, ` t:ψ for
some evidence t. Use Lemma 1 to conclude that ` upi(t):Kiψ, and p is upi(t).
3. If ϕ is obtained by R3, then ϕ is c:A for some constant c and axiom A. Use the evidence
inspection axiom E2 to derive !c:c:A, i.e., !c:ϕ. Here p is !c.
Note that the evidence term p is ground and built from atomic evidence terms by applica-
tions and inspections only. Moreover, the whole derivation of p:ϕ is carried out inside the
LP-part of S4nLP, in particular, R2i has not been used. 2
A similar argument establishes a more general form of internalization: If ψ1, . . . , ψk ` ϕ,
then for some evidence p(x1, . . . , xk),
x1:ψ1, . . . , xk:ψk ` p(x1, . . . , xk):ϕ.
Both of the previous formulations of internalization follow from
Proposition 2. [Lifting]
If ψ1, . . . , ψk, y1:χ1, . . . , yn:χn ` ϕ, then for some evidence p(x1, . . . , xk, y1, . . . , yn),
x1:ψ1, . . . , xk:ψk, y1:χ1, . . . , yn:χn ` p(x1, . . . , xk, y1, . . . , yn):ϕ.
Proof. Similar to Proposition 1 with two new base clauses. If ϕ is ψi, then p is xi. If ϕ is
yj:χ, then p is !yj . 2
The internalization property states that all derived facts have witnesses. Internalization
naturally extends to the case when TnLP, S4nLP, or S5nLP are augmented by new axioms,
each of which has witnessing evidence (e.g., has the form t:ψ for some evidence t).
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Lemma 2. For any formula ϕ and each i = 1, 2, . . . , n there are evidence terms downi(x)
such that TnLP (hence S4nLP and S5nLP) proves x:Kiϕ→downi(x):ϕ.
Proof.
x:Kiϕ→ϕ, by E4 and B2i;
b:(x:Kiϕ→ϕ), introducing evidence b, by Proposition 1;
!x:x:Kiϕ→(b·!x):ϕ, by E1 and propositional logic;
x:Kiϕ→ !x:x:Kiϕ, by E2;
x:Kiϕ→(b·!x):ϕ, by propositional logic.
It suffices now to put downi(x) equal to b·!x such that b:(x:Kiϕ→ϕ) 2
A natural assumption about common knowledge is that ϕ is common knowledge (written
Cϕ) iff all agents know that ϕ and Cϕ. This leads to the Fixed-Point Axiom (cf. [Fagin et
al., 1995]):
Cϕ↔ E(ϕ ∧ Cϕ),
where Eϕ = K1ϕ ∧ . . . ∧ Knϕ. We show that t:ϕ provably satisfies a similar fixed-point
identity in TnLP, S4nLP, and S5nLP.
Proposition 3. For each evidence term t, t:ϕ satisfies the Fixed-Point Axiom for common
knowledge in TnLP ( S4nLP, S5nLP).
Proof. We prove that TnLP ` t:ϕ↔ E(ϕ ∧ t:ϕ).
1. t:ϕ→Kiϕ, for all i = 1, . . . , n, hence t:ϕ→Eϕ
2. t:ϕ→ !t:t:ϕ, hence t:ϕ→ Kit:ϕ, for all i = 1, . . . , n, and t:ϕ→ Et:ϕ
3. t:ϕ→E(ϕ ∧ t:ϕ),
which concludes the left-to-right part of the proof. The right-to-left part E(ϕ ∧ t:ϕ)→ t:ϕ is
straightforward. 2
4 Models
Kripke-style models for modal logics with justifications were introduced in [Artemov, 1994]
and then generalized in [Nogina, 1994; Nogina, 1996; Sidon, 1997; Yavorskaya (Sidon), 2002;
Artemov and Nogina, 2004]. In the last of those papers, Kripke semantics was adopted
for S41LP. Special models capturing evidence were developed in [Mkrtychev, 1997; Fitting,
2003] for the logic of proofs LP, [Artemov and Nogina, 2004; Fitting, 2004] for S41LP.
In this section, we will introduce models for all three systems TnLP, S4nLP, and S5nLP
that contain the aforementioned Kripke, Mkrtychev, and Fitting models as special cases.
At the heart of this semantics lies the idea, which can be traced back to [Mkrtychev, 1997;
Fitting, 2003], of augmenting Boolean (Mkrtychev) or Kripke-style (Fitting) models by an
evidence function which assigns “admissible” evidence terms to a statement, regardless of its
truth value. The statement t:ϕ holds in a given world u iff both of the following conditions
are met: 1) t is an admissible evidence for ϕ in u; 2) ϕ holds in all worlds accessible from u.
An important new feature of these models is a new evidence accessibility relation R. This
innovation provides an additional flexibility in the choice of R so that we may capture all of
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the above-mentioned models and provide an adequate epistemic semantics for a wide range
of systems.
A TnLP-frame is a structure (W,R1, . . . , Rn, R), where W is a non-empty set of states
(possible worlds); R1, . . . , Rn are binary relations on W called accessibility relations, associ-
ated with agents 1, . . . , n respectively; and R is a binary evidence accessibility relation onW .
The relations R1, . . . , Rn are reflexive, R is reflexive and transitive, and R contains all Ri’s.
Hence R contains the transitive closure of R1 ∪ . . . ∪ Rn but does not necessarily coincide
with it. In other words, if v is reachable from u by a finite number of R1, . . . , Rn-edges, then
uRv but the converse is not necessarily true.
Given a frame (W,R1, . . . , Rn, R), a possible evidence function E is a mapping from states
and evidence terms to sets of formulas. We can read ϕ ∈ E(u, t) as “ϕ is one of the formulas
for which t serves as possible evidence in state u.” An evidence function must obey conditions
that respect the intended meanings of the operations on evidence terms.
Definition 2. E is an evidence function on (W,R1, . . . , Rn, R) if for all evidence terms s and
t, for all formulas ϕ and ψ, and for all u, v ∈W :
1. Monotonicity: uRv implies E(u, t) ⊆ E(v, t).
2. Application: ϕ→ψ ∈ E(u, s) and ϕ ∈ E(u, t) implies ψ ∈ E(u, s·t).
3. Inspection: ϕ ∈ E(u, t) implies t:ϕ ∈ E(u, !t).
4. Sum: E(u, s) ∪ E(u, t) ⊆ E(u, s+ t).
A TnLP-model is a structureM = (W,R1, . . . , Rn, R, E , ° ), where (W,R1, . . . , Rn, R) is
a frame with an evidence function E on (W,R1, . . . , Rn, R) and ° is an arbitrary mapping
from sentence variables to subsets of W .
Given a model M = (W,R1, . . . , Rn, R, E , ° ), a forcing relation ° is extended from
sentence variables to all formulas by the following rules. For each u ∈W :
1. ° respects Boolean connectives at each world.
2. u°Kiϕ iff v°ϕ for every v ∈W with uRiv.
3. u° t:ϕ iff ϕ ∈ E(u, t) and v°ϕ for every v ∈W with uRv.
Informally speaking, t:ϕ is true at a given world u iff t is an acceptable evidence for ϕ in u
and ϕ is true at all worlds v accessible from u via a given evidence accessibility relation R.
We say ϕ is true at world u ∈ W if u°ϕ; otherwise, ϕ is false at u. A formula ϕ is true in
a model if ϕ is true at each world of the model; ϕ is valid if ϕ is true in every model.
A constant specification is a map CS from evidence constants to (possibly empty) sets of
axioms. A constant specification CS is full, if it entails internalization (Proposition 1). The
proof of Proposition 1 demonstrates that for a constant specification to be full, it is sufficient
to have a constant for each axiom.
Given a constant specification CS, a model M meets CS if M°a:ϕ whenever ϕ ∈ CS(a).
A derivation (in any of TnLP, S4nLP, or S5nLP) meets CS if whenever rule R3 is used to
produce a:ϕ, then ϕ ∈ CS(a).
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S4nLP- and S5nLP-models are defined as TnLP-models with only this difference: for
S4nLP-models, the accessibility relations R1, . . . , Rn are reflexive and transitive; in S5nLP-
models, R1, . . . , Rn are reflexive, transitive, and symmetric.
A set S of formulas is CS-S4nLP-satisfiable (CS-TnLP-satisfiable, CS-S5nLP-satisfiable) if
there is an S4nLP-model (TnLP-model, S5nLP-models) M, meeting CS, and a world u in it
such that M, u°ϕ for all ϕ ∈ S.
The usual Kripke models for Tn, S4n, and S5n are TnLP-, S4nLP-, and S5nLP-models
respectively, where the evidence part (R and E) is ignored. Mkrtychev models2 for LP are
single-world TnLP-models. Fitting models3 for LPS4 are S41LP-models with R1 = R. Kripke
models for S41LP+ weak negative introspection ¬t:ϕ→2(¬t:ϕ) from [Artemov and Nogina,
2004] are S41LP-models with R =W ×W .
Theorem 1. [Completeness Theorem] Let CS be a constant specification. A formula ϕ is
proved in TnLP (S4nLP, S5nLP) meeting CS iff ϕ holds in all TnLP-models (respectively,
S4nLP-models, S5nLP-models) meeting CS.
Proof. We will give a proof for S4nLP making note of how to modify this proof for the
remaining cases of TnLP and S5nLP.
Soundness is straightforward; we will check t:ϕ→Kiϕ (axiom C1) only. Suppose u° t:ϕ,
then v ° ϕ for all v such that uRv. Since Ri ⊆ R, v ° ϕ for all v such that uRiv, hence
u°Kiϕ.
Completeness is proved using a maximal consistent set construction properly adapted for
evidence-based multi-agent systems. A set of formulas Γ is consistent if there is no finite
subset ϕ1, . . . , ϕn such that ¬(ϕ1 ∧ . . . ∧ ϕn) is provable in S4nLP meeting CS. A consistent
set Γ is maximal consistent if for any formula ψ, either ψ ∈ Γ or ¬ψ ∈ Γ. By the standard
Lindenbaum construction, each consistent set can be extended to a maximal consistent set.
We define the canonical model M = (W,R1, . . . , Rn, R, E ,°) for S4nLP with a given constant
specification CS.
1. W is the collection of all maximal consistent sets.
2. If Γ is a set of formulas, let Γ]i = {ϕ | Kiϕ ∈ Γ} and Γ[ = {ϕ | t:ϕ ∈ Γ}. Now define
the accessibility relations R1, . . . , Rn as follows:
ΓRi∆ iff Γ]i ⊆ ∆, i = 1, . . . , n.
Note that Ri are reflexive and transitive (for S4nLP). For S5nLP, relations Ri are also
symmetric. Suppose ΓRi∆ and Kiϕ ∈ ∆. We claim that Kiϕ ∈ Γ, hence ϕ ∈ Γ and ∆RiΓ.
Indeed, suppose Kiϕ 6∈ Γ, then by maximality, ¬Kiϕ ∈ Γ. By the axiom ¬Kiϕ→Ki¬Kiϕ,
Ki¬Kiϕ ∈ Γ. Since ΓRi∆, ¬Kiϕ ∈ ∆, which contradicts the consistency of ∆.
Define the evidence accessibility relation R as follows:
ΓR∆ iff Γ[ ⊆ ∆.
Note that R is reflexive. Moreover, R is transitive. Indeed, let ΓR∆ and ∆RΘ. If t:ϕ ∈ Γ,
then !t:t:ϕ ∈ Γ and t:ϕ ∈ ∆. Likewise, !t:t:ϕ ∈ ∆ and t:ϕ ∈ Θ. By reflexivity, ϕ ∈ Θ.
2Called pre-models in [Mkrtychev, 1997].
3Called weak models in [Fitting, 2004].
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Let us check that R contains all Ri’s, i = 1, . . . , n. Suppose ΓRi∆ and t:ϕ ∈ Γ. Then
!t:t:ϕ ∈ Γ and Kit:ϕ ∈ Γ hence, t:ϕ ∈ ∆. By reflexivity, ϕ ∈ ∆.
3. Define the evidence function E as follows
E(Γ, t) = {ϕ | t:ϕ ∈ Γ}.
To show that E is an evidence function, we must prove that it satisfies conditions of Defi-
nition 2. Application, Inspection, and Sum are straightforward. For Monotonicity, assume
ϕ ∈ E(Γ, t), i.e., t:ϕ ∈ Γ, and ΓR∆. Again, !t:t:ϕ ∈ Γ hence, t:ϕ ∈ ∆, i.e., ϕ ∈ E(∆, t).
4. Finally, the forcing relation is defined canonically, i.e., for each sentence variable S we
stipulate Γ°S iff S ∈ Γ .
Lemma 3. [Truth Lemma]
Γ°ϕ iff ϕ ∈ Γ .
Proof. By induction on ϕ. The base and Boolean cases are standard. Consider modalities
K1, . . . ,Kn.
If Kiϕ ∈ Γ, and ΓRi∆, then ϕ ∈ ∆. By the induction hypothesis, ∆°ϕ, hence Γ°Kiϕ.
If Kiϕ 6∈ Γ, then Γ′ = Γ]i ∪ {¬ϕ} is consistent. Otherwise ψ1 ∧ ψ2 ∧ . . . ∧ ψl→ϕ would
be provable for some Kiψ1,Kiψ2, . . . ,Kiψl ∈ Γ and hence Kiψ1 ∧Kiψ2 ∧ . . . ∧Kiψl→Kiϕ
would also be provable, which would make Γ inconsistent. Let ∆ be a maximal consistent
set containing Γ′. Then ΓRi∆, ¬ϕ ∈ ∆, hence ϕ 6∈ ∆ and, by the induction hypothesis,
∆ 6°ϕ, which yields Γ 6°Kiϕ.
Now consider the last remaining case of Truth Lemma: ϕ = t:ψ. Let t:ψ ∈ Γ. Then, by
the definition of the evidence function, ψ ∈ E(Γ, t). It remains to show that ∆° ψ for all
∆’s such that ΓR∆. Take such a ∆. By Monotonicity of the evidence function, t:ψ ∈ ∆.
By reflexivity, ψ ∈ ∆. By the induction hypothesis, ∆ ° ψ. Conversely, if Γ ° t :ψ, then
ψ ∈ E(Γ, t) and t:ψ ∈ Γ by the definition of the evidence function E . 2
It is easy to see now that M = (W,R1, . . . , Rn, R, E , ° ) is an S4nLP-model meeting
constant specification CS. Indeed, by the definition of a consistent set, CS ⊆ Γ, for each
Γ ∈W . By Truth Lemma 3, Γ°CS.
Let us finish the proof of Theorem 1. If ϕ is not provable in S4nLP meeting constant
specification CS, then M is a countermodel for ϕ: consider {¬ϕ}, which is consistent, and
hence contained in a maximal consistent set Γ. By Truth Lemma 3, Γ 6°ϕ. 2
5 Compactness and Fully Explanatory property
The above models satisfy the following compactness property, first noticed for canonical
models of LP in [Fitting, 2003; Fitting, 2005].
Proposition 4. [Compactness] For a given constant specification CS, a set of formulas U
is CS-S4nLP-(CS-TnLP-, CS-S5nLP-)satisfiable iff any finite subset of U is CS-S4nLP-(CS-
TnLP-, CS-S5nLP-)satisfiable.
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Proof. Suppose any finite subset of U is CS-S4nLP-satisfiable. We will find a world Γ in the
canonical CS-S4nLP-model such that Γ°U . First, note that U is a consistent set. Otherwise,
for some X1, . . . , Xm ∈ U , CS-S4nLP ` ¬(X1 ∧ . . . ∧Xm), which would make {X1, . . . , Xm}
a finite unsatisfiable subset of U , which is impossible. Extend U to a maximal consistent
set Γ, which is hence a world in the canonical CS-S4nLP-model. Since U ⊆ Γ, by Truth
Lemma 3, Γ°U . 2
Fully Explanatory property of the canonical models for the logic of proofs was discovered
in [Fitting, 2003; Fitting, 2005]. This property might be summarized as “whatever is known,
is known for a reason.”
Definition 3. An S4nLP-(TnLP-, S5nLP-)model is Fully Explanatory provided that, when-
ever v°ϕ for every v such that uRv, then for some proof polynomial t we have u° t:ϕ.
Proposition 5. [Fully Explanatory property] For any full constant specification CS, the
canonical CS-S4nLP-(CS-TnLP-, CS-S5nLP-)model is Fully Explanatory.
Proof. We prove the contrapositive. Let t:ϕ 6∈ Γ for each proof polynomial t. Consider a set
U = Γ[∪{¬ϕ}. We claim that U is consistent. Otherwise, for some t1:ψ1, t2:ψ2, . . . , tk:ψk ∈ Γ,
CS-S4nLP proves ψ1→ (ψ2→ (ψ3→ . . .→ ϕ) . . .). Since CS is a full constant specification,
there is a proof polynomial s such that CS-S4nLP proves s:(ψ1→ (ψ2→ (ψ3→ . . .→ϕ) . . .).
Using E1, we establish that CS-S4nLP proves
t1:ψ1→(t2:ψ2→(t3:ψ3→ . . .→(st1t2 . . . tk):ϕ) . . .).
Hence (st1t2 . . . tk):ϕ ∈ Γ, which contradicts the assumption about Γ.
Now take ∆ to be a maximal consistent extension of U . It is clear that ∆ is a world in
a canonical model and that ΓR∆. By Truth Lemma 3, ∆ 6°ϕ. 2
6 Forgetful evidence-based knowledge
In this section, we introduce a light version of evidence-based knowledge, which we call
forgetful evidence-based knowledge, in the form of a new modal operator Jϕ (read ϕ is
justified) which is the forgetful projection of evidence assertions t:ϕ. In the spirit of this
paper, we consider an axiomatic description first.
Definition 4. The language of forgetful evidence-based knowledge is a modal language with
n + 1 modalities K1, . . . ,Kn, J . Systems TJn, S4
J
n, and S5
J
n are specified as Tn, S4n, and
S5n, with the modalities K1, . . . ,Kn augmented by S4 with the modality J , together with
the forgetful version of the undeniability of evidence principle
Jϕ→Kiϕ,
for all i = 1, . . . , n.
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Apparently, the dummy (n+ 1)st agent corresponding to J plays the role of a sceptical and
not logically omniscient S4-agent who accepts facts only if they are supplied with checkable
evidence. On the other hand, this agent is trusted by all other agents and is capable of
internalizing and inspecting any fact actually proven in the system.
Comment 1. S4Jn corresponds to one of S4-based systems with the “any fool knows” modal-
ity considered in [McCarthy et al., 1979] (with different axiom system). In the latter paper,
the modality “any fool knows” is assumed to be the same type as the modalities of real
agents. In this paper, we consider evidence-based knowledge operators independently from
the real agents knowledge operators.
Lemma 4. In each of TJn, S4
J
n, and S5
J
n,
KiJϕ↔ Jϕ↔ JKiϕ .
Proof. Immediate from Ki-reflexivity and the following derivations.
Jϕ→JJϕ→KiJϕ;
Jϕ→JJϕ→JKiϕ;
KiJϕ→Jϕ;
Kiϕ→ϕ, J(Kiϕ→ϕ), JKiϕ→Jϕ. 2
Proposition 6. Forgetful evidence-based knowledge J satisfies the Fixed-Point Axiom in
each of TJn, S4
J
n, and S5
J
n.
Proof. Deriving the Fixed-Point identity for J in TJn (hence in S4
J
n and S5
J
n)
Jϕ ↔ E(ϕ ∧ Jϕ)
is similar to Proposition 3. 2
Definition 5. TJn-models are Kripke models for (n + 1)-agent modal logics with a frame
(W,R1, . . . , Rn, R), where W is a non-empty set of possible worlds, R1, . . . , Rn are reflexive
accessibility relations on W associated to operators K1, . . . ,Kn respectively, R is a reflexive
transitive relation on W , and Ri ⊆ R for all i = 1, . . . , n. As usual, a forcing relation °
is an arbitrary mapping from propositional letters to subsets of W , which is extended from
propositional letters to all formulas by the usual modal rules.
S4Jn-models are those where R1, . . . , Rn are reflexive and transitive.
S5Jn-models are those with reflexive, transitive, and symmetric R1, . . . , Rn.
Proposition 7. TJn (S4
J
n, S5
J
n) is sound with respect to T
J
n-models (S4
J
n-models, S5
J
n-models).
Proof. The usual modal axioms are valid by our choice of accessibility relations. Jϕ→Kiϕ
is trivially guaranteed by Ri ⊆ R. Indeed, let u°Jϕ and uRiv. Then uRv also holds, which
brings u°ϕ. Hence, u°Kiϕ. 2
Completeness also occurs. For TJn and S4
J
n, this will follow from Theorem 3 below. The
completeness of S5Jn will be established in Theorem 6.
13
Definition 6. A sequent is a pair of finite sets of S4Jn-formulas presented as Γ ⇒ ∆. To
simplify proofs, we assume a Boolean basis→,⊥ and treat the remaining Boolean connectives
as definable ones.
Axioms of S4JnG are the sequents S ⇒ S and ⊥ ⇒, where S is a propositional variable.
The propositional rules of S4JnG are those from the classical propositional Gentzen-style
system, including Weakening and Cut (cf. [Troelstra and Schwichtenberg, 1996]). In addition,
there are n+ 1 pairs of proper modal rules:
ϕ,Γ⇒ ∆
(2,⇒)
2ϕ,Γ⇒ ∆ and
JΓ,2∆⇒ ϕ
(⇒,2).
JΓ,2∆⇒ 2ϕ
where 2 ∈ {K1, . . . ,Kn, J} and 2{φ1, . . . , φm} = {2φ1, . . . ,2φm}.
The Gentzen-style version TJnG of T
J
n has the same rules as S4
J
nG with the (⇒,2) rule
replaced by
JΓ,∆⇒ ϕ
(⇒,2).
JΓ,2∆⇒ 2ϕ
Theorem 2. [Equivalence of Gentzen- and Hilbert-style systems]
Γ⇒ ∆ is provable in S4JnG (TJnG) iff
∧
Γ→∨∆ is provable in S4Jn (TJn).
Proof. The part “only if,” i.e., that S4JnG ` Γ ⇒ ∆ yields S4Jn `
∧
Γ→∨∆, is a standard
exercise in modal derivation. Let us check the soundness of the (⇒,2)-rule in S4JnG. By the
induction hypothesis,
S4Jn `
∧
JΓ ∧∧2∆→ϕ .
By S4-reasoning,
S4Jn `
∧
JΓ→(∧2∆→ϕ) .
By Lemma 4,
S4Jn `
∧
JΓ→2(∧2∆→ϕ) .
Use distribution to establish
S4Jn `
∧
JΓ→(∧22∆→2ϕ) .
By S4-reasoning,
S4Jn `
∧
JΓ→(∧2∆→2ϕ) ,
hence
S4Jn `
∧
JΓ ∧∧2∆→2ϕ .
Let us now check the soundness of the (⇒,2)-rule in TJnG. By the induction hypothesis,
TJn `
∧
JΓ ∧∧∆→ϕ .
By T-reasoning,
TJn `
∧
2JΓ→(∧2∆→2ϕ) .
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By Lemma 4,
TJn `
∧
JΓ→(∧2∆→2ϕ) .
The “if” direction for both S4Jn and T
J
n will be established later in Corollary 1. 2
Below we prove completeness, cut-elimination, and adequacy theorem for S4Jn (TJn) and
S4JnG (TJnG).
Theorem 3. [Consolidated completeness theorem] The following are equivalent:
1. Γ⇒ ∆ is provable in S4JnG (TJnG) without cut;
2. Γ⇒ ∆ is provable in S4JnG (TJnG);
3.
∧
Γ→∨∆ is provable in S4Jn (TJn) ;
4.
∧
Γ→∨∆ is S4Jn-valid (TJn-valid);
5.
∧
Γ→∨∆ is valid in all finite S4Jn-models (TJn-models).
Proof. We will prove the case of S4Jn in detail. The case of TJn is treated similarly, and we
will show what modifications should be made in the S4Jn proof to make it work for T
J
n as
well.
Steps (1) =⇒ (2) and (4) =⇒ (5) are trivial, (2) =⇒ (3) =⇒ (4) has already been covered
above. We will concentrate on proving that (5) =⇒ (1). As usual for this sort of proof, we
assume not (1) and establish not (5), i.e., given that Γ0 ⇒ ∆0 is not provable in S4JnG
without cut, we build a finite S4Jn-modelM, such that at some node ofM, all formulas from
Γ0 hold and all formulas from ∆0 do not hold.
To keep the domain of a model finite, we will consider only formulas from a given finite set
F of formulas closed under subformulas and containing all formulas from the given sequent
Γ0 ⇒ ∆0.
We call a sequent Γ ⇒ ∆ consistent if Γ ⇒ ∆ is not provable in S4JnG without cut. A
sequent Γ⇒ ∆ is called saturated if the following conditions hold:
• ⊥ ∈ ∆;
• ϕ→ψ ∈ Γ yields ψ ∈ Γ or ϕ ∈ ∆;
• ϕ→ψ ∈ ∆ yields ϕ ∈ Γ and ψ ∈ ∆;
• 2ϕ ∈ Γ yields ϕ ∈ Γ where 2 ∈ {K1, . . . ,Kn, J}.
It is easy to see that any consistent sequent Γ ⇒ ∆ can be extended to a saturated
consistent sequent by an obvious terminating saturation procedure. If the original sequent
Γ⇒ ∆ contains only formulas from F , its saturation consists of formulas from F too.
Define a model M = (W,R1, . . . , Rn, R, ° ). W will be the (finite) set of all consistent
saturated sequents.
Let Γ\ = {Jϕ | Jϕ ∈ Γ} and Γ\i = {Kiϕ | Kiϕ ∈ Γ}. Set
(Γ⇒ ∆)R(Γ′ ⇒ ∆′) if Γ\ ⊆ Γ′,
(Γ⇒ ∆)Ri(Γ′ ⇒ ∆′) if Γ\ ∪ Γ\i ⊆ Γ′.
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From this definition, all R1, . . . , Rn, R are reflexive and transitive, and Ri ⊆ R for all i =
1, . . . n.
For TJn we define
(Γ⇒ ∆)Ri(Γ′ ⇒ ∆′) if Γ\ ∪ Γ]i ⊆ Γ′.
Obviously, those Ri’s are reflexive, but not necessarily transitive.
Finally,
(Γ⇒ ∆)°S iff S ∈ Γ for a propositional letter S.
Lemma 5. [Truth Lemma]
1. If ϕ ∈ Γ, then (Γ⇒ ∆)°ϕ;
2. If ϕ ∈ ∆, then (Γ⇒ ∆) 6°ϕ.
Proof. It is established by a standard induction on ϕ. The base and the cases of Boolean
connectives are trivial.
Suppose ϕ = Kiψ. If Kiψ ∈ Γ, and Γ′ ⇒ ∆′ is accessible from Γ ⇒ ∆ by Ri, then
Γ\i ⊆ Γ′, hence Kiψ ∈ Γ′. By the corresponding saturation property, ψ ∈ Γ′. By the
induction hypothesis, (Γ′ ⇒ ∆′)°ψ, hence (Γ⇒ ∆)°Kiψ.
Now let Kiψ ∈ ∆. Then Γ\i ,Γ\ ⇒ ψ is a consistent sequent, otherwise Γ\i ,Γ\ ⇒ ψ
would be derivable in S4JnG without cut. By the (⇒,2)-rule, Γ\i ,Γ\ ⇒ Kiψ would also be
derivable in S4JnG without cut. Hence, by Weakening, Γ ⇒ ∆ is derivable in S4JnG without
cut, which contradicts our assumption of the consistency of Γ ⇒ ∆. Consider a saturated
extension Γ′ ⇒ ∆′ of Γ\i ,Γ\ ⇒ ψ. Since ψ ∈ ∆′, by the induction hypothesis, (Γ′ ⇒ ∆′) 6°ψ.
Obviously, (Γ′ ⇒ ∆′) is accessible from (Γ ⇒ ∆) by Ri, hence (Γ ⇒ ∆) 6°Kiψ. For TJn it
suffices to take a consistent sequent Γ]i ,Γ\ ⇒ ψ instead of Γ\i ,Γ\ ⇒ ψ.
Suppose ϕ = Jψ. If Jψ ∈ Γ, and Γ′ ⇒ ∆′ is accessible from Γ⇒ ∆ by R, then Γ\ ⊆ Γ′,
hence Jψ ∈ Γ′. By the corresponding saturation property, ψ ∈ Γ′. By the induction
hypothesis, (Γ′ ⇒ ∆′)°ψ, hence (Γ⇒ ∆)°Jψ.
Let Jψ ∈ ∆. Then Γ\ ⇒ ψ is a consistent sequent, since otherwise Γ\ ⇒ ψ would be
derivable in S4JnG without cut. By the (⇒,2)-rule, Γ\ ⇒ Jψ would also be derivable in S4JnG
without cut, hence Γ ⇒ ∆ would be inconsistent. Consider a saturated extension Γ′ ⇒ ∆′
of Γ\ ⇒ ψ. Since ψ ∈ ∆′, by the induction hypothesis, (Γ′ ⇒ ∆′) 6°ψ. Since (Γ′ ⇒ ∆′) is
accessible from (Γ⇒ ∆) by R, (Γ⇒ ∆) 6°Jψ. 2
Here is the standard conclusion of the proof of Theorem 3. Let Γ ⇒ ∆ be a sequent
not provable in S4JnG without cut, hence consistent. Consider its saturated consistent ex-
tension (Φ ⇒ Ψ), which is an element of W . Since Γ ⊆ Φ and ∆ ⊆ Ψ, by Lemma 5, all
formulas from Γ hold at (Φ⇒ Ψ) and all formulas from ∆ do not hold at (Φ⇒ Ψ). Hence
(Φ⇒ Ψ) 6°∧Γ→∨∆. 2
Corollary 1.
1. Cut-elimination theorem in S4JnG and T
J
nG.
2. Completeness of S4Jn with respect to S4
J
n-models and T
J
n with respect to T
J
n-models.
3. Finite model property of S4Jn and T
J
n.
4. Decidability of S4Jn and T
J
n.
5. Equivalence of S4Jn to S4
J
nG and TJn to TJnG (Theorem 2).
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Now we are ready to show that TJn and S4
J
n are exactly the forgetful projections of TnLP
and S4nLP respectively, defined by a translation ( )◦ which maps t:ϕ to Jϕ and commutes
with all other connectives.
Theorem 4.
(TnLP)o ⊆ TJn and (S4nLP)o ⊆ S4Jn.
Proof. A straightforward induction on derivations in TnLP and S4nLP. It suffices to ob-
serve that the forgetful translations of all axioms and rules of TnLP and S4nLP are TJn- and
S4Jn-compliant, respectively. 2
The converse claim that TJn ⊆ (TnLP)o and S4Jn ⊆ (S4nLP)o, is a much trickier Realization
Theorem.
Theorem 5. [Realization Theorem] There is an algorithm that given a TJn-derivation (S4
J
n-
derivation) of a formula ϕ, retrieves a TnLP-derivation (S4nLP-derivation) of a formula ψ
such that (ψ)o = ϕ.
Proof. First, find a cut-free proof of a given formula in S4Jn (TJnG). Then run the realizability
algorithm from [Artemov, 2001], Theorem 9.4, to retrieve evidence terms at every occurrence
of the modality J in this derivation. Here is a brief exposition of how the realization algorithm
works. We consider S4Jn only; the case of T
J
n is quite similar.
We call a realization r of modality J in a given formula or sequent normal if all negative
occurrences of J are realized by proof variables.
We will speak about a sequent’s Γ⇒ ∆ being derivable in S4Jn meaning S4Jn `
∧
Γ→∨∆,
or, equivalently, S4JnG ` Γ ⇒ ∆. Moreover, since S4Jn enjoys the deduction theorem, S4Jn
derives Γ⇒ ϕ iff Γ ` ϕ in S4Jn iff S4JnG ` Γ⇒ ϕ.
Consider a cut-free derivation T of a sequent ⇒ ϕ in S4JnG. It suffices now to construct
a normal realization r such that S4nLP `
∧
Γr→∨∆r for any sequent Γ ⇒ ∆ in T . Note
that in T , the rules respect polarities; all occurrences of J introduced by (⇒,2) are positive,
and all negative occurrences are introduced by (2,⇒) or by Weakening. Occurrences of J
are related if they occur in related formulas of premises and conclusions of rules; we extend
this relationship by transitivity. All occurrences of J in T are naturally split into disjoint
families of related ones. We call a family essential if it contains at least one instance of the
(⇒, J) rule where the modality J of this family has been introduced.
The desired r will be constructed by steps 1 – 3 described below. We reserve a sufficiently
large set of proof variables as provisional variables.
Step 1. For every negative family and nonessential positive family, we replace all occur-
rences of Jφ by “x:φ” for a fresh proof variable x.
Step 2. Pick an essential family f , enumerate all the occurrences of rules (⇒, J) which
introduce the modality J of this family. Let nf be the total number of such rules for the
family f . Replace all boxes of the family f by the polynomial
v1 + . . .+ vnf ,
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where vi’s are fresh provisional variables. The resulting tree T ′ is labelled by S4nLP-formulas,
since all occurrences of the kind Jφ in T are replaced by t:φ for corresponding proof poly-
nomials t.
Step 3. Replace the provisional variables by proof polynomials as follows. Proceed from
the leaves of the tree to its root. By induction on the depth of a node in T ′ we establish
that after the process passes a node, the sequent assigned to this node becomes derivable
in S4nLP. The axioms S ⇒ S and ⊥ ⇒ are derivable in S4nLP. For every rule other than
(⇒, J), we do not change the realization of formulas and just establish that the concluding
sequent is provable in S4nLP, given that the premises are. It is clear that every move down
in the tree T ′ other than (⇒, J) is derivable in S4nLP.
Let an occurrence of the rule (⇒, J) have number i in the numbering of all rules (⇒, J)
from a given family f . The corresponding node in T ′ is labelled by
y1:B1, . . . , yk:Bk ⇒ B
y1:B1, . . . , yk:Bk ⇒ (u1 + . . .+ unf ):B ,
where y1, . . . , yk are proof variables, u1, . . . , unf are proof polynomials, and ui is a provisional
variable. By the induction hypothesis, the premise sequent y1:B1, . . . , yk:Bk ⇒ B is derivable
in S4nLP. By the Lifting Lemma (Proposition 2), construct a proof polynomial t(y1, . . . , yk)
such that
S4nLP ` y1:B1, . . . , yk:Bk ⇒ t(y1, . . . , yk):B.
Since
S4nLP ` t:B→(u1+. . .+ui−1+t+ui+1+. . .+unf ):B
we have
S4nLP ` y1:B1, . . ., yk:Bk ⇒ (u1+. . .+ui−1+t+ui+1+. . .+unf ):B.
Now substitute t(y1, . . . , yk) for ui everywhere in T ′ (and the corresponding constant speci-
fication CS).
Note that t(y1, . . . , yk) has no provisional variables, and that there is one less provisional
variable (namely ui) in T ′. The conclusion of the given rule (⇒, J) becomes derivable in
S4nLP, and the induction step is complete.
Eventually, we substitute polynomials of non-provisional variables for all provisional vari-
ables in T ′ and establish that the root sequent of T ′ is derivable in S4nLP. The realization
r built by this procedure is normal. 2
Note that the current version of the realization algorithm can produce proof polynomials
which are exponential in the size of the original cut-free derivation in S4JnG. A more efficient
realization algorithm has been described in [Brezhnev and Kuznets, 2005], where the realizing
proof polynomials are quadratic in the size of the original cut-free derivation in S4JnG.
The case of S5Jn needs a separate treatment.
Definition 7. S5Jn-models are the models from Definition 5 with reflexive, transitive, and
symmetric relations R1, . . . , Rn.
Theorem 6. S5Jn is sound and complete with respect to S5
J
n-models.
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Proof. The soundness part is straightforward. In particular, Jϕ→Kiϕ is trivially guaran-
teed by Ri ⊆ R.
The completeness part is done by the standard maximal consistent set construction. A
set Γ is consistent if for any finite ∆ ⊆ Γ, S5Jn 6` ¬(
∧
∆). W is a collection of all maximal
consistent sets, ΓRi∆ iff Γ]i ⊆ ∆, ΓR∆ iff Γ] ⊆ ∆, where Γ] = {ϕ | Jϕ ∈ Γ}. All Ri
and R are reflexive and transitive. Let us check the inclusions Ri ⊆ R. Suppose ΓRi∆ and
Jϕ ∈ Γ. Since S5Jn ` Jϕ→KiJϕ, Jϕ→KiJϕ ∈ Γ and KiJϕ ∈ Γ, hence Jϕ ∈ ∆ and ϕ ∈ ∆.
Therefore ΓR∆.
Moreover, each of Ri, i = 1, . . . , n is symmetric (hence each is an equivalence relation).
Indeed, let ΓRi∆ and Kiϕ ∈ ∆. It suffices to show that Kiϕ ∈ Γ (hence ϕ ∈ Γ). Suppose
Kiϕ 6∈ Γ. Then ¬Kiϕ ∈ Γ. By S5-axiom ¬Kiϕ→Ki¬Kiϕ, Ki¬Kiϕ ∈ Γ. Since Γ]i ⊆ ∆,
¬Kiϕ ∈ ∆ as well, a contradiction.
As usual, Γ°S iff S ∈ Γ for any sentence variable S. We have shown that the resulting
construction (W,R1, . . . , Rn, R, ° ) is an S5Jn-model.
The Truth Lemma says that for any formula ϕ
Γ°ϕ iff ϕ ∈ Γ.
The proof follows from a standard induction on ϕ. Let us check the case when ϕ = Jψ. If
Jψ ∈ Γ, then ψ ∈ ∆ for all ∆ such that ΓR∆. By the induction hypothesis, ∆°ψ for all ∆
such that ΓR∆. Hence Γ° Jψ. If Jψ 6∈ Γ, then Γ] ∪ {¬ψ} is a consistent set. Otherwise,
for some finite subset Θ of Γ, Θ] ` ψ and, by modal logic rules, Θ ` Jψ, hence Jψ ∈ Γ, a
contradiction. Take a maximal consistent set ∆ containing Γ] ∪ {¬ψ}. Apparently, ψ 6∈ ∆,
hence by the induction hypothesis, ∆ 6°ψ and Γ 6°Jψ.
Theorem 6 now follows immediately. 2
Theorem 7. S5Jn is the forgetful projection of S5nLP, i.e., (S5nLP)o = S5
J
n.
Proof. Again, the proof of (S5nLP)o ⊆ S5Jn is given by a straightforward induction on
derivations in S5nLP.
The existence of an S5nLP-realization of any theorems of S5Jn can be established seman-
tically by methods developed in [Fitting, 2005]. The main ingredients of Fitting’s semantical
realizability proof are the Fully Explanatory property of S5nLP-models with full constant
specifications (Proposition 5) and the Compactness property (Proposition 4).
Definition 8. By S5nLP− we mean a system S5nLP in a language without ‘+’ and without
axioms E3. Models of S5nLP− are the same as for S5nLP except that the evidence function is
not required to satisfy the Sum condition. We may assume that S5nLP-models and S5nLP−-
models are also models for S5Jn with R being an accessibility relation for the modality J .
Note that such features as internalization and the Fully Explanatory property of the canonical
model hold for S5nLP− and S5nLP−-models as well.
Assume an S5Jn-formula ϕ is fixed for the rest of the proof of Theorem 7. By “subformula
of ϕ” we will mean an “occurrence of a subformula of ϕ.”
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Definition 9. Let A be any assignment of proof variables to subformulas of ϕ of the form
Jφ that are in a negative position. We define two mappings wA and vA of subformulas of ϕ
to sets of formulas of S5nLP and S5nLP−, respectively.
1. If P is an atomic formula (including ⊥), then wA(P ) = vA(P ) = {P}.
2. wA(X→Y ) = {X ′→Y ′ | X ′ ∈ wA(X) and Y ′ ∈ wA(Y )}.
vA(X→Y ) = {X ′→Y ′ | X ′ ∈ vA(X) and Y ′ ∈ vA(Y )}.
3. If KiX is a negative subformula of ϕ, then
wA(KiX) = {KiX ′ | X ′ ∈ wA(X)},
vA(KiX) = {KiX ′ | X ′ ∈ vA(X)}.
4. If KiX is a positive subformula of ϕ, then
wA(KiX) = {KiX ′ | X ′ ∈ wA(X)},
vA(KiX) = {Ki(X1 ∨ . . . ∨Xk) | X1, . . . , Xk ∈ vA(X)}.
5. If JX is a negative subformula of ϕ, then
wA(JX) = {x:X ′ | A(JX) = x and X ′ ∈ wA(X)},
vA(JX) = {x:X ′ | A(JX) = x and X ′ ∈ vA(X)}.
6. If JX is a positive subformula of ϕ, then
wA(JX) = {t:X ′ | X ′ ∈ wA(X) and t is any proof polynomial},
vA(JX) = {t:(X1 ∨ . . . ∨Xk) | X1, . . . , Xk ∈ vA(X) and t is any proof polynomial}.
By ¬vA(X) we mean {¬X ′ | X ′ ∈ vA(X)} (which has nothing to do with vA(¬X)).
Lemma 6. Let CS be a full constant specification of S5nLP− and M be a canonical model
for S5nLP− that meets CS. Then for each world Γ of the model:
1. If ψ is a positive subformula of ϕ then Γ°¬vA(ψ) yields Γ°¬ψ.
2. If ψ is a negative subformula of ϕ then Γ°vA(ψ) yields Γ°ψ.
Proof. Induction on ψ. The atomic case as well as the cases of Boolean connectives are
straightforward (cf. Proposition 7.7 in [Fitting, 2005]).
Suppose ψ isKiX, ψ is a positive subformula of ϕ, Γ°¬vA(KiX), and the result is known
for X (which also occurs positively in ϕ). We show that Γ]i ∪¬vA(X) is consistent. Indeed,
otherwise in Γ]i ` X1 ∨ . . . ∨ Xk for some X1, . . . , Xk ∈ vA(X). By the Ki-necessitation
rule, Γ ` Ki(X1 ∨ . . . ∨ Xk). Hence Γ ° Ki(X1 ∨ . . . ∨ Xk), which is impossible since
Ki(X1 ∨ . . .∨Xk) ∈ vA(KiX). Now, extend Γ]i ∪¬vA(X) to a maximal consistent ∆, which
is therefore a world inM accessible from Γ by Ri. Since ¬vA(X) ⊆ ∆, ∆°¬vA(X). By the
induction hypothesis, ∆°¬X. Therefore, Γ°¬KiX.
Suppose ψ is KiX, ψ is a negative subformula of ϕ, Γ°vA(KiX), and the result is known
for X (which also occurs negatively in ϕ). In particular, Γ°KiX ′, for each X ′ ∈ vA(X). Let
∆ be an arbitrary world such that ΓRi∆. Then ∆°X ′, hence ∆°vA(X). By the induction
hypothesis, ∆°X. Therefore Γ°KiX.
Suppose ψ is JX, ψ is a positive subformula of ϕ, Γ°¬vA(JX), and the result is known
for X (which also occurs positively in ϕ). We show that Γ[ ∪ ¬vA(X) is consistent. Indeed,
otherwise, by compactness, {Y1, . . . , Ym,¬X1, . . . ,¬Xk} is inconsistent for some Y1, . . . , Ym ∈
Γ[ and X1, . . . , Xk ∈ vA(X). This means that
S5nLP
− ` Y1→(Y2→ . . .→(Ym→X1 ∨ . . . ∨Xk) . . .) .
By internalization, there is a proof polynomial s such that
S5nLP
− ` s:[Y1→(Y2→ . . .→(Ym→X1 ∨ . . . ∨Xk) . . .)] .
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Consider proof polynomials t1, t2, . . . , tm such that t1:Y1, t2:Y2, . . . , tm:Ym ∈ Γ. By E1 and
propositional reasoning,
S5nLP
− ` t1:Y1 ∧ t2:Y2 ∧ . . . ∧ tm:Ym→(st1t2 . . . tm):[X1 ∨ . . . ∨Xk] .
Therefore
Γ°(st1t2 . . . tm):[X1 ∨ . . . ∨Xk],
which is impossible since (st1t2 . . . tm):[X1 ∨ . . . ∨Xk] ∈ vA(JX).
Let ∆ be a maximal consistent extension of Γ[ ∪ ¬vA(X). Obviously, ΓR∆ and ∆ °
¬vA(X). By the induction hypothesis, ∆°¬X, hence Γ°¬JX.
Suppose ψ is JX, ψ is a negative subformula of ϕ, Γ°vA(JX), and the result is known
for X (which also occurs negatively in ϕ). Let X ′ be an arbitrary element of vA(X). Then
Γ ° x:X ′, where x is a proof variable assigned to this occurrence JX by the mapping A.
For any world ∆ such that ΓR∆, ∆°X ′. By the induction hypothesis, ∆°X. Therefore
Γ°JX. 2
Now suppose S5Jn ` ϕ but S5nLP− 6` (ϕ1 ∨ . . . ∨ ϕm) for all ϕ1, . . . ϕm ∈ vA(ϕ) with a
given full constant specification CS. Then every finite subset of ¬vA(ϕ) is satisfiable. By
compactness (Proposition 4) adapted to S5nLP−, there is a world Γ in the canonical model
for S5nLP− with CS such that Γ°¬vA(ϕ). By Lemma 6, Γ°¬ϕ. Therefore, since S5Jn ` ϕ,
there are ϕ1, . . . ϕm ∈ vA(ϕ) such that S5nLP− ` (ϕ1 ∨ . . . ∨ ϕm).
Lemma 7. For every subformula ψ of ϕ and each ψ1, . . . ψm ∈ vA(ψ), there is a substitution
σ of proof polynomials for proof variables and a formula ψ′ ∈ wA(ψ) such that:
1. If ψ is a positive subformula of ϕ, S5nLP ` (ψ1 ∨ . . . ∨ ψm)σ→ψ′.
2. If ψ is a negative subformula of ϕ, S5nLP ` ψ′→(ψ1 ∧ . . . ∧ ψm)σ.
Proof. We use the fact that proof variables assigned to different (occurrences of) subformulas
Jψ in ϕ are all different.
Induction on ψ. Again, the atomic case as well as the cases of Boolean connectives are
straightforward (cf. Proposition 7.8 in [Fitting, 2005]).
Suppose ψ is KiX, ψ is a positive subformula of ϕ, and the result is known for X (which
also occurs positively in ϕ). Let KiD1, . . . ,KiDm ∈ vA(KiX). Those D1, . . . , Dm are
disjunctions of formulas from vA(X). By the induction hypothesis, there is a substitution
σ and X ′ ∈ wA(X) such that S5nLP ` (D1 ∨ . . . ∨ Dm)σ → X ′. Consequently, for each
j = 1, . . . ,m, S5nLP ` Djσ → X ′. By necessitation, S5nLP ` Ki(Djσ → X ′), hence
S5nLP ` KiDjσ→KiX ′. Therefore,
S5nLP ` (KiD1 ∨ . . . ∨KiDm)σ→KiX ′.
Suppose ψ is KiX, ψ is a negative subformula of ϕ, and the result is known for X (which
also occurs negatively in ϕ). Let KiX1, . . . ,KiXm ∈ vA(KiX). By the induction hypothesis,
there is a substitution σ and X ′ ∈ wA(X) such that S5nLP ` X ′→ (X1 ∧ . . . ∧ Xm)σ. By
necessitation, S5nLP ` KiX ′ → Ki(X1 ∧ . . . ∧ Xm)σ. Since Ki commutes with σ and ∧,
S5nLP ` KiX ′→(KiX1 ∧ . . . ∧KiXm)σ.
Suppose ψ is JX, ψ is a positive subformula of ϕ, and the result is known for X (which
also occurs positively in ϕ). In this case ψ1, . . . ψm ∈ vA(ψ) are of the form t1:D1, . . . , tm:
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Dm, where each of D1, . . . , Dm is a disjunction of formulas from vA(X). By the induction
hypothesis, there is a substitution σ and X ′ ∈ wA(X) such that
S5nLP ` (D1 ∨ . . . ∨Dm)σ→X ′.
Consequently, for each j = 1, . . . ,m, S5nLP ` Djσ→X ′. By internalization, there is a proof
polynomial sj such that S5nLP ` sj:(Djσ→X ′). Then S5nLP ` (tj:Dj)σ→ (sj ·tjσ):X ′. Set
t = (s1 ·t1σ) + . . .+ (sm ·tmσ). We have S5nLP ` (tj:Dj)σ→ t:X ′, and hence
S5nLP ` (t1:D1 ∨ . . . ∨ tm:Dm)σ→ t:X ′.
Suppose ψ is JX, ψ is a negative subformula of ϕ, and the result is known for X (which
also occurs negatively in ϕ). In this case ψ1, . . . ψm ∈ vA(ψ) are of the form x:X1, . . . , x:Xm,
where each of X1, . . . , Xm is from vA(X). By the induction hypothesis, there is a substi-
tution σ and X ′ ∈ wA(X) such that S5nLP ` X ′→ (X1 ∧ . . . ∧ Xm)σ. Since the variable
x is not assigned by A to any of subformulas of X, we may assume that x is not in the
domain of σ. From the above, it follows that S5nLP ` X ′ → Xjσ. By internalization,
S5nLP ` tj:(X ′→Xjσ) for some proof polynomial tj . Therefore, S5nLP ` s:(X ′→Xjσ) for
s = t1+ . . .+ tm. Furthermore, S5nLP ` x:X ′→(s·x):(Xjσ) for each j = 1, . . . ,m. Consider
a new substitution σ′ = σ ∪ {x/(s·x)}. Obviously, S5nLP ` x:X ′→ (x:X1 ∧ . . . ∧ x:Xm)σ′,
which completes the proof of Lemma 7. 2
To conclude the proof of Theorem 7, assume that S5Jn ` ϕ. Then there are ϕ1, . . . ϕm ∈
vA(ϕ) such that S5nLP− ` ϕ1 ∨ . . . ∨ ϕm. By Lemma 7, there is a substitution σ and
ϕ′ ∈ wA(ϕ) such that S5nLP ` (ϕ1 ∨ . . . ∨ ϕm)σ→ϕ′. Since S5nLP is closed under substitu-
tion, S5nLP ` ϕ′. 2
Theorem 7 yields an algorithm that given S5Jn-theorem ϕ, retrieves a S5nLP-theorem ψ
such that (ψ)o = ϕ. Indeed, arrange an enumeration of all S5nLP-realizations of ϕ and their
proof searches in S5nLP. By Theorem 7, this process should terminate with success. A
question of finding an efficient realization algorithm for S5Jn remains open.
The results of this section show that J may be regarded as the forgetful version of
evidence-based knowledge. Using forgetful EBK-systems instead of the original EBK-systems
makes sense, since the former are conventional multi-modal logics which are easier to work
with. On the other hand, EBK-systems have a solid justification, which can be extended to
the corresponding forgetful EBK-systems. In particular, this provides an EBK-semantics for
the dummy “any fool” agent for S4Jn from [McCarthy et al., 1979].
Note that models for TnLP, S4nLP, and S5nLP are also models for TJn, S4
J
n, and S5
J
n
respectively, as well. It suffices to regard the evidence accessibility relation R in models for
TnLP, S4nLP, and S5nLP as the accessibility relation for J .
7 Evidence-Based Knowledge vs. Common Knowledge
In this section, we compare evidence-based knowledge systems and common knowledge sys-
tems. First of all, we recall that the evidence part in EBK-systems can be chosen inde-
pendently of the knowledge system for individual agents, whereas the common knowledge
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operators are determined by the individual knowledge systems for the agents. Therefore,
evidence-based knowledge systems cover more situations than the common knowledge sys-
tems. When both systems are present, e.g., in the case of S4Jn and S4
C
n , it is fair to compare
them.
Operators C and J can be compared model theoretically. Each S4Cn -model is an S4
J
n-
model, but not the other way around, since the evidence accessibility in S4Jn-models contains
(but not necessarily coincides with) the reachability on the frame (W,R1, . . . , Rn). We could,
however, impose a structure of an S4Cn -model on any S4
J
n-model by adding the reachability
relation for the operator C, which is done in a unique way for a given S4Jn-model. The
resulting modelsM support the languages of both S4Cn and S4Jn, thus providing a reasonable
context for comparing knowledge operators C and J . The logic S4JCn is the set of tautologies
in the langauge containing K1, . . . ,Kn, J, C.
Proposition 8. Evidence-based knowledge is stronger than common knowledge, i.e.,
1. Jϕ→Cϕ is valid;
2. Cϕ→Jϕ is not valid.
Proof. 1. This obviously follows, since the common knowledge accessibility is a subset of
the evidence accessibility.
2. For a counterexample, take a two-element modelW = {a, b}, Ri = {(a, a), (a, b), (b, b)},
RJ = Ri ∪ {(b, a)}. Then the transitive closure of all Ri will be the same Ri. Consider a
forcing relation such that a 6° S and b ° S for some sentence variable S. In this setup,
b°C(S), but b 6°J(S). 2
This baby example demonstrates, however, the main model-theoretical difference between
common knowledge and evidence-based knowledge: the former captures the greatest solu-
tion of the Fixed-Point common knowledge equation Cϕ ↔ E(ϕ ∧ Cϕ), whereas the latter
considers all of its solutions.
To compare valid principles of common knowledge and evidence-based knowledge, con-
sider a syntactic transformation ∗ that converts all occurrences of J into C.
Proposition 9. Each evidence-based principle is a common knowledge principle, i.e.,
(S4Jn)
∗ ⊆ S4Cn ,
but not vice versa.
Proof. For (S4Jn)∗ ⊆ S4Cn , it suffices to prove the ∗-translations of all the axioms and rules of
S4Jn in S4
C
n . Let us check, for example, the necessitation rule for J : S4
J
n ` ψ ⇒ S4Jn ` Jψ.
Suppose S4Cn ` ψ∗, then S4Cn ` >→E(ψ∗). Use the Induction Rule of S4Cn (cf. [Fagin et al.,
1995]) to conclude that S4Cn ` Cψ∗, i.e., S4Cn ` (Jψ)∗. The remaining cases can be recovered
by inspecting [Fagin et al., 1995].
To show the remaining part of the claim, consider a valid S4Cn principle4
ιC = ϕ ∧ C(ϕ→Eϕ)→Cϕ,
such that its J version
ιJ = ϕ ∧ J(ϕ→Eϕ)→Jϕ
4This example was offered independently by Evan Goris and Eric Pacuit.
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is not valid for S4Jn. Indeed, consider the same model as in the proof of Proposition 9.2, and
pick ϕ such that a 6°ϕ, but b°ϕ. Then b° J(ϕ→Eϕ), since at each node where ϕ holds
(b only), Eϕ also does (b is the only node accessible from b by agent’s relations R1, . . . , Rn).
Hence b°ϕ ∧ J(ϕ→Eϕ). On the other hand, a 6°ϕ, bRa, hence b 6°Jϕ. 2
8 Solution of the wise men puzzle
In this section, we will use evidence-based systems to give a solution to the wise men
puzzle from [Fagin et al., 1995], p.12. The story goes as follows:
There are three wise men. It is common knowledge that there are three red hats
and two white hats. The king puts a hat on the head of each of the three wise
men, and asks them (sequentially) if they know the color of the hat on their head.
The first wise man says that he does not know, the second wise man says that
he does not know, then the third wise man says that he knows.
(a) What color is the third wise man’s hat?
(b) Suppose the third wise man is blind and that it is common knowledge that
the first two wise men can see. Can the third wise man still figure out the color
of his hat?
We pick the smallest of EBK systems above, T3S4, describe the puzzle in its language, and
present a solution consisting of a formal derivation in the corresponding theory.
Let atomic propositions pi stand for “wise man i has a red hat” (i = 1, 2, 3),
“000” for ¬p1 ∧ ¬p2 ∧ ¬p3;
“001” for (¬p1 ∧ ¬p2 ∧ p3);
. . .
“111” for (p1 ∧ p2 ∧ p3).
Let also Ki$ϕ be a shorthand for Kiϕ∨Ki¬ϕ, i.e., “i knows whether ϕ.” Note that Kipi is
equivalent in T3S4 to
(pi→Kjpi) ∧ (¬pi→Kj¬pi).
The basic assumption that each wise man observes the other wise men’s hats is represented
by the additional axiom “KNOWING ABOUT THE OTHERS,” or “K.A.O.” for short:
K.A.O. =
∧
j 6=i
Kj$pi.
The rules of the game can be described by the theory
W(0) = T3S4+ J(K.A.O.) + J(¬000).
The situation after the first and second wise men said they didn’t know is represented by a
theory
W(2) =W(0)+ J(¬K1$p1) + J(¬K2$p2).
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Theorem 8. W(2) ` Jp3
Proof. We have now a comfortable choice of methods ranging from model reasoning to
all sorts of proof systems. We will choose the latter and present a concise Hilbert style
derivation in W(2).
First, we prove J(¬100).
1. 100→¬p2 ∧ ¬p3, by propositional logic;
2. 100→K1(¬p2) ∧K1(¬p3), from J(K.A.O.);
3. 100→K1(¬p2 ∧ ¬p3), by modal logic reasoning;
4. K1(¬p2 ∧ ¬p3)→K1p1, from J(¬000);
5. 100→K1p1, from 3. and 4.;
6. ¬K1$p1→¬100, from 5.;
7. J(¬K1$p1)→J(¬100), from 6., by J reasoning;
8. J(¬100), from J(¬K1$p1) and 7.
Likewise, using J(¬K2$p2) we obtain J(¬010).
Next, we prove J(¬110). Indeed,
1. p1 ∧ ¬p3→110 ∨ 100, by propositional logic;
2. p1 ∧ ¬p3→110, from J(¬100);
3. p1 ∧ ¬p3→p2, by propositional logic;
4. K2p1 ∧K2¬p3→K2p2, by modal logic reasoning;
5. p1 ∧ ¬p3→K2$p2, from J(K.A.O.);
6. 110→K2$p2, by propositional logic;
7. ¬K2$p2→¬110, by propositional logic;
8. J(¬K2$p2)→J(¬110), by J reasoning;
9. J(¬110), from J(¬K2$p2) and 8.
Since all truth combinations of p1, p2 with ¬p3 have been ruled out in W(2), this theory
proves p3, hence Jp3. 2
Corollary 2. Wise man 3 wears a red hat, and he will know this after the answers of 1 and
2, even without seeing their hats.
Indeed, the above reasoning does not make use of the facts that K3$p1 and K3$p2.
One could also wonder whether conditions formalized in W (2) are consistent. Here
is a T3S4-model for W (2): W consists of three nodes (001), (011) and (101); R1, R2, R3
are reflexive, (001)R1(101) and (001)R2(011), R = W × W ; (001) ° p3, (011) ° p2, p3,
(101)°p1, p3.
Formal methods are also good for verifying proofs and for analyzing assumptions made.
In particular, here we can see that one does not need to assume the whole power of S5
reasoning to solve this puzzle. A modest T as the agent knowledge logic and S4 as the
evidence component do the job just fine.
9 Discussion
The inspection axiom for evidence t :ϕ → !t : t :ϕ requires that each evidence assertion t
is supported by some other evidence !t. This principle is nothing but an explicit version
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of a transitivity assumption commonly accepted as a property of knowledge, including the
common knowledge. Since such a verification evidence could be of a very general character,
we believe the inspection axiom holds for a wide range of situations involving evidence.
Monotonicity of evidence,
t:ϕ→ [(s+ t):ϕ ∧ (t+ s):ϕ],
requires that a given evidence t of ϕ remains such in the presence of any other piece of evi-
dence s. This principle imposes certain restrictions on the class of situations covered by this
kind of evidence-based approach. However, monotonicity has been a hidden assumption in
the modal approach to knowledge in general. One needs this or a similar principle to provide
all modal theorems with explicit evidence reading. Evidence-based knowledge systems just
made this assumption explicit.
The language with explicit evidence also provides an opportunity to express principles
which lie off the scope of the standard logic of knowledge. Here is an example from [Artemov
and Nogina, 2004]. The weak principle of negative introspection ¬x:ϕ→2(¬x:ϕ) holds, for
example, for formal provability. It makes sense to consider extending S4-based systems by
this principle without committing to S5.
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